The analysis of information as a public good rests on two assumptions: contractual incompleteness and self-interest. In this setting, self-interested agents compare transaction costs of alternative institutional arrangements and alleviate problems related to the limited appropriability of information by either public support (in science), or intellectual property (in commercial applications). The limitations of such an analysis are evident in the debates over the commodification of scientific knowledge. Rather than facing this problem head on, some writers have opted for a halfway solution. They add knowledge as the fourth fictitious commodity into Karl Polanyi’s framework, indeed, without much elaboration. These limitations are much better addressed by a tripartite framework which is found in the works of Karl Polanyi and Elinor Ostrom. This framework not only overcomes the dichotomy between states and markets, but also shows how and why other-regarding and social preferences matter in coordinating economic interactions. In the paper, we extend Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework on knowledge commons by analysing how co-evolutionary dynamics applies to knowledge production. Economic agents determine the characteristics of knowledge when producing it, yet, at the same time, these characteristics affect actions of these agents, e.g. intellectual property could affect individuals’ decision about sharing knowledge. Moreover, co-evolutionary processes are sensitive to initial conditions. If there exist complementarities between the actions  of agents and the characteristics of the resource, e.g. between self-interest and private intellectual property, or other-regarding preferences and sharing, this raises the possibility of multiple institutional equilibria favouring certain institutional arrangements at the expense of others only because of specific initial conditions. In such an environment, there is a role to be played by entrepreneur as well as public authorities since their actions directly define the characteristics of the resource. The ongoing debate in knowledge commons as well as concerns over the commodification of knowledge may help avoid lock-in to a certain institutional arrangement (e.g. private intellectual property), hence the over-privatization of knowledge. Both public policy and entrepreneurial activity may help keep institutional diversity alive in knowledge sharing and production, and thereby contribute to the sustainability of the resource as well as restraining the marginalization of other-regarding and social preferences that are at the centerpiece of knowledge commons.