The aim of this work is discussing the role of norms in a practical approach to economic choice. A practical approach to political economy can find a connection between economics and the law assuming normative theoretical elements as relevant items in economic reasoning. Such approach is defined as economic reasoning finalised to concrete action. It includes the choice of the ends of economic action and not only the best means to reach them. It also involves deciding action starting from uncertain knowledge, keeping the ends as open to redefinition (Crespo, 2017). Ends of human action are object of choice (in parallel to action itself), also, but exclusively, in sight of the consequence of action. The microeconomic framing of ethical behaviour is a widely studied issue since the beginning of political economy – which in fact derived from ethical and political studies. The general characteristic of ethical approaches is that the fact-value dichotomy does not hold. Positive statements are always in some way dependent on what ought to be. This is what in Aristotelian/Hegelian terms we can understand as including the idea of ‘intrinsic natural goodness’ into scientific theorising. There is a common good that is taken as a reference as an ethical element and it derives from the nature of society itself. The ethical element is therefore not extrinsic to economic reasoning and therefore it is hard to conjugate it with a positive (neutral) approach. All this can be understood in the framework of the idealist philosophy of Hegel that considered freedom a normative achievement (Pippin, 2011). This fact also complicates the definition of actor’s utility function, becoming changeable in reaction to external events.

In order to make sense of these issues a broadly ‘Hegelian’ theoretical framework is here adopted, finding a contribution from other contemporary reflections on the theory of choice (Searle , Raz and Honneth), allowing to understand the relational dimension of economics and covering what was not theorised by Hegel himself. It is called Hegelian in the sense that the ethical element is fundamentally defined in the dynamic interaction between the individual and the social level, where a common good is defined. In this framework rights and rules can be considered endogenous or nearly-endogenous to economic decisions, focussing on actual (historically determined) rules and rights as those that are effectively perceived by the interacting parties. Therefore, the proposed perspective includes a definition of the legal elements entering economic interactions, which are conceived here as being framed by the identities of the interacting parties and by their reciprocal recognition of rights. Liberty, therefore, is seen as a normative achievement, that is to say, as being juridically framed as it is in ethical liberalism. Normativity in this way derives from recognition and legitimacy. On the contrary, it makes little sense to frame normativity in abstract and general terms.