This session aims to analyze the problem of the relationship between cultural evolution and theory of institutions in the Twentieth century. In this regard, Friedrich von Hayek’s contribution needs mentioning. The illustrious representative of the Austrian School put forward a theory of spontaneous order  resulting in the continuous interaction among individuals. These interactions, even though such an interaction is not tantamount to a specific project, it allows rules to emerge and, ultimately, such conduct is to be adopted by society.  Rules and institutions are therefore the result of procedures, behaviours and moral codes that have settled over time.

According to the theorists of the Austrian School, the process of gaining new knowledge includes previous experiences that have rooted in institutions , which come across as an attempt to overcome our ignorance. Our mind, after all, resembles a system that is forced to adapt continuously to the surrounding environment. It is interesting to note how the theory of spontaneous order has allowed scholars to propose a theory of institutions that aim to demonstrate how they bar human action, but also they account for sources of information. To put simply: the relation between unwritten norms (the nomos, as Hayek called it) and legislation is not unidirectional: institutions influence the interactions between individuals and, consequently, the exchange and production of knowledge.

The interventions of this session will follow a chronological order. The first one will be focused on the criticism of Carl Menger to those theories of institutions that claim to identify the concept of the common good and to put it at the heart of a social, economic or political institution. Assuming that ethical-political values impact on the economy are the result of the continuous exchange of knowledge and information among individuals, Menger develops two critiques: on the one hand, he posits that the common good cannot be considered the result of a relationship amongst individual.

The second paper will focus on the relationship between moral institutions and economic performance starting from the thought of James M. Buchanan. We want to propose the idea that, for Buchanan,  economic constitutionalism can be better defended in the presence of a specific ethical structure that permeates society. According to Buchanan, in fact, there is a close relationship between social customs and economic development. We can therefore contend that a strong cultural identity, which  characterises small social units, determines a better relationship between citizens and governments. Cultural identity determines a greater 'communion of intentions' between rulers and the governed and such quicker 'communion' makes decision making quicker and more transparent. To make this case much more compelling, some little-known Buchanan articles will be  analysed, like those about Japan. Japanese society would have been able to maintain strong moral values (spirit of sacrifice, frugality, respect for authority, etc.) that favourably reflected on its development its economic development. Generally speaking, the decline of such values in the West would contribute to causing adversities.

The third paper follows the evolutionary institutionalism of Hodgson, Knudsen and Witt. It presents a proposal of human free will within the boundaries of the Darwinian framework. The argument consists in a way to think to the intentional human intervention as just an element of the environment into which the evolutionary process takes place. Vice versa, the paper excludes that the free human will directly intervenes in the process itself.