“Un programme est une simple énumération de revendications. Le plan est un ensemble de mesures conditionnées par leur cohésion” (H. de Man quoted in Noyelle 1934: 1597).

Economic planning developed in France soon after WWII, initially as a way to face the problems of reconstruction. The “First Plan”, developed for the years 1947-1952, was a crucial complementary tool of the European Recovery Program. Its main object was the modernization of some basic sectors and the promotion of a general economic recovery. Thereafter, however, planning becomes the accustomed means for French economic policy to deal with not only industrial modernization but also economic and social development.

With the establishment of the Common Market, France tried, unsuccessfully, to extend her “indicative planning” approach to the European level, as it was the only way to preserve it after the borders opening and with the new communitarian tightening rules. Accordingly, in order to face the strong oppositions that came especially from Germany, France adopted a particularly cautious attitude: the term “indicative planning” was substituted with the more neutral “programming” whereas several distinctive aspects of her original planning approach were relaxed or discharged (most notably from the fourth Plan onwards).

In this way what has been called a “déplanification souple” (Bauchet, 1966) developed in France whereas the European Community finally rejected any form of (medium or long term) programming and settled for the creation of a less ambitious “economic union”. Main aim of this paper is to inquire into the debate over “planning” and “programming”, its contents, its results, and its consequences for the European integration process.