Last modified: 2017-05-30
Abstract
In the present paper I take stock of this historical work to discuss four main philosophical issues that have underlain and shaped, typically in an implicit way, the theory and practice of utility measurement in economics. The four issues are as follows:
1) The understanding of measurement: which forms of quantitative assessment of utility do utility theorists consider as actual measurement?
2) The scope of the utility concept: how broadly is the concept of utility defined? And how does the scope of the utility concept affect the approach to utility measurement?
3) The ontological status of utility: does the economic concept of utility refer to some existing mental entity (realist view), or is utility a purely theoretical construct that has proven useful for explaining/predicting some important economic phenomena but does not necessarily have any real mental correlate (anti-realist view)?
4) The data for utility measurement: which kind of data can be legitimately used to measure utility?
The present paper is a history-based exercise in analytical philosophy. In it I make explicit the often-implicit stance that utility theorists took on those four issues from the marginal revolution to the rise of behavioral economics, and discuss how their views about those issues shaped their theories and practices of utility measurement.References
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